The Limits of Consequentialism: ICTY Conditionality and (Non)Compliance in Post-Milosevic Serbia

The Limits of Consequentialism: ICTY Conditionality and (Non)Compliance in Post-Milosevic Serbia

Since 2000—the dusk of the Milosevic-era—three successive Serbian governments, the Djindjic, Zivkovic and Kostunica administrations, have amassed an inconsistent and oscillating record of (non)compliance with EU and US conditionality for full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal on the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). How do we explain this changing pattern of compliance and noncompliance by Serbia? This paper contends that international rules and norms which attempt far-reaching institutional and social change, such as ICTY conditionality in Serbia, will likely elicit a historical process that is multidimensional and diachronic, more politically complex than the parsimony suggested by incentives-based, model-driven theorizing. The paper argues for a more contextual and practice-oriented approach to the study of compliance politics; focusing on how material, normative and temporal dimensions interact historically to form particular compliance processes & outcomes. The empirical section uses inductive process-tracing to make a temporal reconstruction of the process and experience of Serbian (non)compliance with ICTY conditionality during the Kostunica government; focusing on the interaction between three dimensions of compliance politics: (1) strategic calculation; (2) identity & cultural resonance; and (3) temporality.
 
Full text available at: https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v4i1.192

Rajkovic, Nikolas Milan

Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies; 2008: RERA V4:1 Spring 2008 (backfile abstracts)

2562-8429

10.22215/cjers.v4i1

Centre for European Studies, Carleton University

2008-04-01

info:eu-repo/semantics/article

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

Peer-reviewed Article