Conceptually Ambitious, Hardly Novel, and Currently Failing: The Irish Army Reserve in the Single Force Concept.
In 2013 the Irish Defence Forces went under significant reorganisation. Part of this organisation entailed integrating the Irish Army Reserve into the Defence Forces, as part of the ‘Single Force Concept’. Ostensibly, the Single Force Concept sought to provide a more reliable, fit for purpose, reserve force. However, this article argues that the concept has failed and that the Army Reserve is almost unusable. The article evaluates each service corps and provides an analysis of Reserve capabilities. This shows that the training of the force is suboptimal for augmenting the regular army in an emergency, and that a gap exists between what government policy wants the Reserve to do, and what it is actually capable of doing. This has resulted in an unusable reserve force with questionable utility. This article also highlights the difficulty of establishing the qualitative strength of the Army Reserve in the absence of appropriate means of defining what is meant by an ‘effective’ reservist, and explores the detrimental consequences of paltry financial investment in sustaining, developing, or enabling the Reserve as an effective force. It argues that the Single Force Concept has failed because it did not remedy the fundamental pre-existing flaws that plagued the various iterations of the Irish reserve land component prior to 2013, nor did it attempt to bring the Army Reserve into line with international best practice regarding reserve forces. The article concludes by arguing that the current Irish reserve model is unsustainable, and that fundamental changes are required in order to make the force usable to the State, and to prevent it from collapsing altogether.
Journal Of Military History and Defence Studies; Vol. 1 No. 1 (2020): Journal of Military History and Defence Studies, January 2020
Copyright (c) 2020 Journal Of Military History and Defence Studies
The Defence and Evacuation of the Kuban Bridgehead, January -October 1943: examining a forgotten campaign in the German-Soviet War
This article examines the little-known battles fought by German and Soviet forces over the Kuban bridgehead on the north-eastern coast of the Black Sea from January to October 1943. The bridgehead formed when the German Seventeenth Army withdrew into the Taman Peninsula as Army Group A retreated from the Caucasus in the wake of the defeat at Stalingrad. Seventeenth Army held the position through the spring, summer and autumn of 1943, before withdrawing to the Crimea. The campaign can be viewed as an interesting microcosm of the entire German-Soviet war. Many of the events and trends of the wider war can be seen at a smaller scale in the Kuban: the seemingly unstoppable German advance that was halted against the odds in a shattered industrial area, and the gradual and often unsteady transformation of the Red Army from the chaos and catastrophe of the early period of the war to a skilfully led and professional fighting force, in parallel with the Wehrmacht’s gradual but inexorable decline in both quantitative and qualitative terms. The entire rationale for holding the bridgehead is an early example of Hitler’s inflexible and unrealistic strategic vision as the tide of war turned, and the campaign fell under post-war rewriting of history by the Soviet leadership to overstate the contributions of senior political figures and erase mistakes and defeats from the record. The campaign has been largely overlooked in the published English language history of the war. This article addresses that lack of attention, providing a detailed exploration of the campaign based on German and Russian sources to offer new insight and understanding of a rarely analysed part of the war.
British Naval Aviation 1908-1914: A Case Study of Military Innovation
This paper examines the development of British naval aviation in the period 1908 to 1914 in the light of modern theories of military innovation. The case is of particular interest because it took place in peacetime in a force which had enjoyed global supremacy for a century, strong contra-indications of the inclination and the capacity for organisational change. The case study examines the development of British naval aviation along two dimensions of innovation: strategy and technology. The analytical tools are the four schools of ‘Military Innovation Theory’ as identified by Grissom. The evidence is derived from the relatively limited body of secondary material and the archives of the Admiralty, the Air Ministry and the Cabinet. The evidence from these sources seems to indicate that what Grissom refers to as the ‘civil military’ theory is the most persuasive. This theory was originated by Posen in 1984 and relies heavily on neo-realist approaches to international relations. It holds that while the default position of the military is conservative, the international environment generates challenges which prompt political leaders to insist the military respond. The decisions of the Liberal Government, and especially of Churchill from 1911, seem to reflect this position. The other theory which offers some purchase is the ‘cultural’ theory which Grissom associates with Theo Farrell. In this theory the behaviour of the military is determined by values and traditions. In the case of the Royal Navy, the officer corps was technically oriented as a result of education and experience and this facilitated the development of naval aviation. The paper demonstrates that by itself, naval technical competence would not have brought the naval air service to the relatively high level it had attained by August 1914. That required the intervention of the civil authorities responding in the fashion prescribed by the civil military theory. Culture was facilitative but the neo-realist processes were determinative.
The contribution of the Irish soldier to the British Army during the Peninsula campaign 1808 – 1814
The majority of the historiography concerning the Irish contribution to the British army during their campaign on the Iberian Peninsula (1808 -1814) has focused on the Irish regiments and their service with Wellington in Portugal, Spain and France. While the significance of research into these regiments is undeniable it has unintentionally resulted in an under appreciation of the true extent of the Irish soldier’s contribution. The purpose of this paper is to add to the existing historiography by examining the wider Irish contribution in order to arrive at an empirical based assessment as to the criticality of the Irish soldier to Wellington’s victory during the Peninsula war. The majority of Irish soldiers who served in the Peninsula did so in English and Scottish infantry regiments. Their abilities and crucially their integration into the British army were key success factors for Wellington during the Peninsula campaign. An examination of how this was achieved forms a key part of this paper which finds that the capabilities of the Irish soldier and the British army organisational structure and system mutually supported each other. Furthermore, the Irish officer’s contribution has only been assessed based on individual accounts and narratives in the absence of any in-depth evaluation of their actual numbers. With over 30 per cent of Wellington’s officers being Irish an analysis of their levels of command was undertaken to demonstrate their significance to the overall conduct and operation of the Peninsula army. To fully understand the Irish soldier’s contribution an assessment of their combat effectiveness building on the preceding quantitative findings and utilising modern concepts of combat motivation and behaviours was undertaken. The findings indicate that while the Irish soldier’s contribution was much wider and central to victory in 1814 than is generally appreciated or understood, the British army of the period recognised its importance and, despite popular misperceptions, did not at an institutional level seek to discriminate against the Irish soldier. The paper concludes that Irish soldiers were of critical importance to British victory not only in terms of their numbers but also due to their successful integration into the wider British army outside of Irish regiments, their presence in large numbers at all levels of command and their overall combat effectiveness. Without this contribution it can be argued that British victory would not have been achieved in the Peninsula.
Ireland and the Waterloo Campaign of 1815
Ireland’s experience of the Waterloo campaign has been consistently under-explored, despite the degree of attention paid to the campaign by historians. This paper shows that that experience was far more significant and multi-faceted than has generally been recognised. Irish people played an important practical role in the events of 1815. Irish soldiers saw service in their thousands during the campaign, at every rank from private to general. These men represented a comprehensive cross-section of contemporary Ireland, coming from every county on the island and from every kind of socio-economic background. Some Irish soldiers and military units earned distinction for their actions on the battlefield and a number of participants from the country left valuable primary testimony. Civilian Irish women and children were also caught up in events in Belgium. Domestically, Ireland was a centre of activity as hostilities against Napoleon developed and analysis of contemporary media coverage and private correspondence makes it clear that ongoing events on the Continent had a keenly engaged Irish audience. Waterloo also left a distinctive legacy for Ireland and for Irish people. This paper explores all of these issues in detail, providing a thorough examination based on primary sources to address the impact of Waterloo on Ireland, and of the Irish on Waterloo.
Promoting Reflexivity in Masters Research: Reflections on a 20-Year Teaching Partnership between Maynooth University and the Irish Defence Forces
This paper serves as an introduction to this second edition of the Journal of Military History and Defence Studies. It explains the origin and nature of the educational partnership that exists between the Irish Defence Forces and Maynooth University. In particular, it focuses on the MA in Leadership, Management and Defence Studies (LMDS), a masters level postgraduate qualification embedded into the Joint Command and Staff Course. It discusses the philosophy that underpins the programme, emphasising the ways in which it seeks to enhance the students' capacity for reflexivity and criticality, before introducing each contribution in this edition, all of which are based on research undertaken as part of the MA in LMDS. Please note that the views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and should not be taken to represent the views of the Irish Defence Forces, the Command and Staff School or any other group or organisation.
Journal Of Military History and Defence Studies; Vol. 1 No. 2 (2020): Journal of Military History and Defence Studies, November 2020; 5-11
Mission Command: An Exploration of its Issues in Multinational Units
This paper explores the application of mission command in binational and multinational units within the NATO context. It explores differences in understanding and application of mission command, amongst NATO members, and identifies the negative impact that these can have on the behaviour of tactical leaders, and on mission accomplishment, within a multinational context. The paper demonstrates that the understanding and therefore the application of mission command differs between the NATO members; that this influences the leadership style of superiors and their willingness to transfer trust and responsibility, and to assume risk; and, that differences in language, understanding and meaning of terms, and different contents of intents result in a negative influence, all of which are exacerbated by political influence. On the other hand, modern technology in binational or multinational units supports and promotes the application of mission command. The paper concludes with recommendations to mitigate these problems and to create the conditions where mission command can be employed successfully. Please note that the views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and should not be taken to represent the views of the Bundeswehr, the Irish Command and Staff School or any other group or organisation.
Journal Of Military History and Defence Studies; Vol. 1 No. 2 (2020): Journal of Military History and Defence Studies, November 2020; 75-106
Is the Irish Defence Forces Developing the Necessary Capability to Meet the Operational Requirements of its UN CIMIC Roles? A Case Study of CIMIC Operations in Lebanon
This article examines the Irish Defence Forces’ (DF) approach to contemporary Civil Military Co-operation (CIMIC) operations in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), seeking to discover whether or not the DF is developing the necessary capability to meet the operational requirements of its UN CIMIC roles. The paper focuses on the manner in which the DF selects and trains personnel for this operational task, and the degree to which this enables the organisation to meet UN requirements. The article explores international military best practice relating to pre-deployment training and examines Irish policy and practice, presenting the results of interviews conducted with relevant Irish personnel. The research demonstrates that, while there is no doubt that the DF is meeting the operational requirements of its UN CIMIC tasks, this may be the result of its soldiers’ collective attitudes and behaviour rather than by design. This suggests that Irish soldiers make good peacekeepers, but that this may not be closely connected to any pre-deployment training relating to CIMIC. Please note that the views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and should not be taken to represent the views of the Irish Defence Forces, the Command and Staff School or any other group or organisation.
Journal Of Military History and Defence Studies; Vol. 1 No. 2 (2020): Journal of Military History and Defence Studies, November 2020; 142-172
Oral History: Utilising the Experience of Others
The Irish Defence Forces Leadership Doctrine emphasises the need for lifelong study and experiential learning, and the Defence Forces have considerable experience in managing oral history projects, including the Bureau of Military History and the Military Archives Oral History Projects. However, Irish doctrine does not outline any formal method to capture these experiences as a leadership development tool or to enhance organisational memory. The aim of this paper is to examine the value of utilising oral history for leadership development and organisational memory. It demonstrates that there is a risk to organisational memory unless a formal methodology is in place to capture the experiences of Defence Forces members and connected personnel. The use of tacit knowledge, which has facilitated the handover of information to date, is not sufficient nor is the written record alone. This paper shows that a combination of multiple primary sources, including the written record and oral history, provides an opportunity to enhance leadership development. It also demonstrates that the use of oral history provides an opportunity to capture the social and human aspect of Defence Forces activities to not only enhance organisational memory but to understand the context within which decisions were made. Please note that the views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and should not be taken to represent the views of the Irish Defence Forces, the Command and Staff School or any other group or organisation.
Journal Of Military History and Defence Studies; Vol. 1 No. 2 (2020): Journal of Military History and Defence Studies, November 2020; 107-141
"Strengthen the Nation": Exploring the Motivating Factors Leading to Irish Defence Forces Recruitment
Responding to a dearth of literature on the subject, this paper explores and examines what motivates people to join the Irish Defence Forces. In addition, it examines recruitment strategy and policy within the Defence Forces, in order to assess the degree to which this is appropriate to meet current needs. The paper explores the difficulties and challenges that all militaries currently face in attracting, enlisting, and retaining the required numbers of new recruits, with reference to current scholarship and to ideas relating to motivational theory. Analysis of the Irish case is based on a qualitative research design situated within an interpretive paradigm. Utilising a mixed methods methodology, data was collected through the use of focus groups, questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. Findings from this research indicate that themes such as pride, challenge and self- improvement appear to be strong motivating factors for recruitment. On the basis of this, a number of recommendations are suggested including key policy changes and resource investment that will assist the Defence Forces in addressing both the challenges of military recruitment both now and in the future. Please note that the views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and should not be taken to represent the views of the Irish Defence Forces, the Command and Staff School or any other group or organisation.
Journal Of Military History and Defence Studies; Vol. 1 No. 2 (2020): Journal of Military History and Defence Studies, November 2020; 40-74