India-Iran Relations and the Afghanistan Factor
Post-America’s chaotic withdrawal and the resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan, India’s development and assistance prospects in the country demand stability under the interim regime. Likewise, New Delhi’s Chabahar port development – an initiative along with Iran – seems to remain stalled until the situation in Afghanistan steadies down. With India not being invited (under Pakistani and Chinese objections) in any of the extended troika meetings initiated by Russia, it is imperative for India to develop a one-to-one discussion with the interim government as the country has invested over US$3 billion for Afghanistan reconstruction and development in various aspects. Towards the end of August, India initiated its first public meeting with the Taliban in Doha wherein Indian concerns on the continuation of its developmental efforts in Afghanistan, progress on Chabahar development (though the issue was not explicitlymentioned), and insistence on Taliban not supporting any terror outfits that may harm Indian national security were the prime areas of discussions amongst others. While Afghanistan remains important for India for a host of reasons, the latter’s continued engagement is crucial in maintaining its relations with Iran with which India has had a tumultuous relationship of late owing to the American sanctions on that country.
Centre For Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, India
Copyright (c) 2021 Centre For Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, India
Face Off: Analysis of India’s Capability to Fight a Two Front War : KW Publishers, New Delhi (2021) ISBN 978-93-89137-92-7, 616 pp.
The book Face-Off: Analysis of India’s Capability to Fight a Two-Front War by Ravi Rikhye, a distinguished author with 35 books to his credit and expertise in military matters offers a detailed narration of India’s capability to fight a two-front war. It is a well-researched book that presents cogent arguments on the subject of India’s capability to fight a two-front war.
India Versus China: Why They Are Not Friends: Juggernaut Books, New Delhi (2021) ISBN 978-93-9116-508-6, 284 pp.
Taking the Eastern Ladakh crisis as the backdrop, Kanti Bajpai, a renowned scholar of international affairs with a special interest in India-China relations, in his book India Versus China: Why They Are Not Friends contextualises the antagonism in the India-China ties by drawing from the past and assessing the implications of it in the present and future. As Bajpai emphatically posits: “Why did these two societies become locked into a conflict that has stubbornly refused to go away?” (p. 1). To which, Bajpai suggests the need for a deeper introspection as proved by the Ladakh crisis, the relations between the two countries “are darker and more complex than most observers appreciate or acknowledge” (ibid.). To be specific, as Bajpai asks in the very title- Why India and China are not Friends?
India’s geographical breadth and reach, have ensured an extensive and extended neighborhood which has provided the policymakers with a complex range of difficulties that are almost a microcosm of the challenges confronting the global community as a whole. As a result, India’s foreign policy toward its extended neighborhood, like that of any other country must embrace the goals of improving opportunities for its citizens to maintain and enrich their life by providing them with a safe and secure environment. Keeping this in the background, the CLAWS Journal 2022 Summer issue has selected the theme—“India’s Strategic Neighbourhood”.The phrase “strategic neighborhood” can be defined in a variety of ways. Apart from Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh, nations sharing land and maritime borders with India include China, Myanmar, Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives, and this goes beyond the geographical description of South Asia. Several countries outside of this list are also linked to India through close economic and diasporic ties, as well as developments perceived by Indian policymakers as having strategic implications; this category includes countries along the Indian Ocean, the East African coast, the Gulf region, Afghanistan, the Central Asian region, and countries in Southeast Asia
CLAWS Journal; Vol. 15 No. 1 (2022): Summer 2022; v-vi
Copyright (c) 2022 Centre For Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, India
India’s Strategic Outlook Towards Its Neighbourhood States
The purpose of the paper is to examine the problematics that the neighbourhood states face, their fault lines, and how they affect thepeace and stability in South Asia in general and towards India in particular. The analysis of the same would lead us to define India’sstrategic outlook and decision-making. It would hence be necessary to cast India’s Strategic outlook in relation to the conceptualisation of the term National Interest, the emerging global order and the fault lines in the new Global Order, and a brief understanding of the phenomenon of nuclear proliferation, collapse of Communism and keeping in mind Huntington’s postulation of the clash of civilisation and its aftereffects as we see in the 21st century.
CLAWS Journal; Vol. 15 No. 1 (2022): Summer 2022; 1-20
India’s Strategic Gameplan vis-à-vis China-Pak Collusive Linkage
The basic approach of this article is to discuss an outline optimum strategy or broad game-plan to tackle collusive Sino-Pak threats. The detailed strategy and specific action plan are beyond the scope of this article. However, deliberations and inferences drawn in this article can help refine/validate template for such formulation. It will be appropriate to reiterate that clarity on threat parameters is an essential pre-requisite for planning levels of preparedness, force structures, equipment profile, modernisation and budgetary allocations, hence these are discussed in brief. Reasonable assumptions have been factored in, where necessary, as detailed national security policies are yet to be promulgated.
CLAWS Journal; Vol. 15 No. 1 (2022): Summer 2022; 21-37
India, Vietnam in the Indo-Pacific: A Unifying Construct
Is Indo-Pacific the one overarching forum, evolving from a geopolitical imagination that can bring the two countries closer? If itbe so, then what are the avenues and possibilities that exist in the Indo-Pacific sphere for India and Vietnam, and what are the benefits and drawbacks of subscription to such a concept? Will it be feasible enough to sustain the aspirations as well as concerns of the two countries or there is a need for returning back to basics, and entrusting ASEAN with the centrality which is required for peace and security in the larger Asia-Pacific region. Is China a necessary evil or is it being demonised by the western media? What could be the contours of the evolving geopolitical order when alternatives such as BRICS, SCO, and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank have been getting attention and subscription from countries across Europe, Africa, and Asia? Has regionalism lost sheen and bilateralism is the only way to deal with larger security and political issues. This paper would address these issues and look for possibilities with regard to India and Vietnam cooperating in the geo-political, and geo-strategic construct which is now known as Indo-Pacific.
CLAWS Journal; Vol. 15 No. 1 (2022): Summer 2022; 38-55
India and Bangladesh: A Multi Faceted Relationship
The physical map of the Indian subcontinent depicts an integrated landmass, bounded by the Pamirs/ Hindukush to the North West and the Himalayas to the North, with the Patkai Range, Naga, and Chin Hills forming a natural border between India’s North-Eastern states and Myanmar. The ends of the Indian Peninsula are bounded by the seas in three directions. This article attempts to review important aspects of the continuously evolving India-Bangladesh relationship—as Bangladesh, today with the second largest GDP in South Asia, journeys through its fifty-first year as an independent nation.
CLAWS Journal; Vol. 15 No. 1 (2022): Summer 2022; 56-71
India and Myanmar have deep historical, cultural, ethnic, and commercial links. Common geopolitical, economic, and security interestsexist that are spread across vast land and maritime frontiers. Apart from this, there is a sizeable Indian diaspora residing in Myanmarfor generations. India’s land border with Myanmar of over 1600 km, involving Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoramadjoin Kachin, Sagaing, and Chin states across. Myanmar also serves as the land bridge to South East Asia and coupled with the maritime connection in the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea, makes it a very important neighbor in the region’s security calculus.
CLAWS Journal; Vol. 15 No. 1 (2022): Summer 2022; 72-85
India’s Strategic Concerns from Nepal & Bhutan
Peace and tranquillity in the Himalayas are essential for India’s security and cordial relations with China. This has been a long-standingunderstanding of the Indian government and was also stressed and reiterated by the Indian officials during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to India in March 2022. Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar said that relations between the two countries cannot be normal unless there is total disengagement of forces by China. He reminded China to respect treaties and agreements signed between the two countries on border-related issues.1 A peaceful and stable border is relevant for not only the Indian Himalayas but also for the Himalayan countries having common borders and border-related issues with China.